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Abstract In his review of neural binding problems,
Feldman (Cogn Neurodyn 7:1–11, 2013) addressed two
types of models as solutions of (novel) variable binding.
The one type uses labels such as phase synchrony of
activation. The other (‘connectivity based’) type uses
dedicated connections structures to achieve novel variable
binding. Feldman argued that label (synchrony) based
models are the only possible candidates to handle novel
variable binding, whereas connectivity based models lack
the flexibility required for that. We argue and illustrate that
Feldman’s analysis is incorrect. Contrary to his conclusion,
connectivity based models are the only viable candidates
for models of novel variable binding because they are the
only type of models that can produce behavior. We will
show that the label (synchrony) based models analyzed by
Feldman are in fact examples of connectivity based mod-
els. Feldman’s analysis that novel variable binding can be
achieved without existing connection structures seems to
result from analyzing the binding problem in a wrong
frame of reference, in particular in an outside instead of the
required inside frame of reference. Connectivity based
models can be models of novel variable binding when they
possess a connection structure that resembles a small-world
network, as found in the brain. We will illustrate binding
with this type of model with episode binding and the
binding of words, including novel words, in sentence
structures.
Keywords Behavior  Frame of reference  Small-word
networks  Novel variable binding
Introduction
Feldman (2013) reviewed a number of solutions of neural
binding problems as reported in the literature. Neural
binding problems arise when information is processed in
different neural circuits, distributed over the brain. One
example is the visual processing of shape (e.g., the iden-
tification of a face), which begins with the detection of
oriented lines in the primary visual cortex. Because a face
is more than a collection of oriented lines, the question
arises how the processing of these lines is recombined into
the recognition of the face. Other examples in vision are
the binding of visual features of an object (e.g., its shape,
color, motion, location), which are also (partly) processed
in different brain areas. Outside vision, binding problems
arise, for example, in language processing. Sentences
consist of words and words consist of phonemes and
morphemes. Again the question is how these different parts
of information are combined.
The examples given already show that binding problems
can arise in different domains. In his review Feldman
aimed to reduce the confusion in discussing the binding
problem by distinguishing between binding problems
arising in coordination, the subjective unity of perception,
visual feature binding and variable binding (e.g., binding
words in a sentence structure). It is indeed a sensible
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approach to distinguish between different forms of the
binding problem.
However, Feldman (2013) did not reduce the confusion
in this treatment of (novel) variable binding. In this section,
Feldman primarily compared two types of models. One of
those he referred to as ‘static’ models. In these models,
variable binding depends on a given (available) connection
structure. The other type of models could be referred to as
‘label’ models. In these models, binding seems to be
achieved by marking the activation of the variables to be
bound (e.g. John as the agent of loves in John loves Mary)
with some (changeable) label, such as synchrony of
activation.
The best known model of binding by synchrony,
according to Feldman, is Shruti (Shastri and Ajjanagadde
1993). Hence, Feldman used binding by synchrony in
Shruti to illustrate variable binding, including novel vari-
able binding, such as the binding of (novel) items in novel
sentences or propositions. In Feldman’s view ‘static’
models are inadequate for novel variable binding, because
it would seem that novel variable bindings would require
novel connection structures, which are not available at that
moment. So, label models as given by synchrony of acti-
vation, such as Shruti, would be the only viable candidates
in Feldman’s view.
We will show that Feldman’s analysis of novel variable
binding in both types of models is incorrect. We will show
that models based on available connection structures (i.e.,
‘static’ models in Feldman’s terminology) are the only
viable candidates for neural models of variable binding,
including novel binding. Label (synchrony) based models
are either specific examples of models based on available
connection structures, or they are, in a fundamental way,
inadequate as models of neural binding.
Examples of models based on available connection
structures are models of episode binding in the hippo-
campus (Norman and O’Reilly 2003), binding of percep-
tion and action (Zylberberg et al. 2010) and models of
binding words in sentence structures (van der Velde and de
Kamps 2006a, b, 2010). As we will show, the binding
process in such models is in fact very dynamical. Hence,
we prefer the label ‘connectivity based’ instead of ‘static’
for models depending on existing connection structures.
The reason why connectivity based models are the only
viable candidates as models of binding derives from the
fact that they are the only models that can produce
behavior, which is an essential requirement for any neural
model of cognition. We will illustrate that synchrony
(label) based models indeed reduce to connectivity based
models whenever they produce behavior.
The reason why connectivity based models can be
models for binding derives from the fact that the connec-
tion structure of the brain resembles that of a ‘small-world
network’ (Watts and Strogatz 1998). Such connection
structures provide the flexibility needed for novel variable
binding. This is even true for the binding of novel items
(e.g., words) in novel structures (e.g., sentences), provided
we take the boundary conditions on these forms of binding
into account.
We will discuss these issues in turn. We start with the
issue of variable binding in novel combinations, because
that issue is crucial for the discussion in our paper.
Variable binding in novel combinations
The issue of novel binding of variables is introduced by
Feldman in the following way (2013, p. 7b): ‘‘if I tell you
that my granddaughter Sonnet is brilliant, you have a new
person to consider as a possible filler for variable roles and
also a number of new facts for use in inference.’’ Note the
emphasis here on a ‘‘new person’’ and ‘‘new facts’’. ‘‘New
person’’ could be seen as a new name or word, ‘‘new facts’’
could be seen as new propositions. In other words, we have
the ability to bind new words in new propositions never
seen before, and a binding theory/model would have to
account for that in Feldman’s view (and ours). According
to Feldman, the fact that we can bind new words in new
propositions indicates that we need a label such as syn-
chrony to achieve variable binding. A binding model based
on available connection structures would not be able to do
this in his view, because the connection structure that in-
tegrates the new name in a new proposition would not be
available.
Although the possibility of novel variable combinations
is just one of the issues related to binding, it is a crucial one
because it relates to an important aspect of human cogni-
tion. Human cognition is productive in the sense that we
can create and understand an unlimited set of variable
combinations (e.g., sentences in language).
George Miller, for example, derived a lower bound of
this ability by calculating how many sentences could be
made of 20 words or less, using a lexicon of the size of
human language. He arrived at a set of 1020 sentences (see
Pinker 1994). By comparison, the life time of the universe
since the Bing Bang as estimated by astronomy is in the
order of 1018 s. So, this ‘Miller set’ of sentences (propo-
sitions) is so large that we cannot have a dedicated repre-
sentation for most of them. Notice in particular that the set
of all propositions that is stored in a long term memory,
i.e., the set of sentences for which we do have dedicated
representations, is only a (very) small subset of the Miller
set.
Yet, we can understand any arbitrary sentence from the
Miller set, certainly in the sense that we can answer ‘who
does what to whom’ questions about such a sentence, even
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though we could not have encountered most of these sen-
tences before. The ‘Sonnet’ sentence of Feldman, quoted
above, is an example (explicitly constructed as such by
Feldman). In fact, if ‘Sonnet’ is a new name (word), this
sentence is even outside the Miller set, because that is
based on an existing lexicon. So, we can even understand
novel sentences with new words in it. We could call this
the ‘extended Miller set’.
Thus, the ‘Sonnet’ sentence that Feldman used to
illustrate the issue of novel binding is a sentence that we
have never seen or heard before, but that we can under-
stand. In particular we could answer a question like ‘‘who
is brilliant?’’. The relevance for the issue of variable
binding is that most sentences in the (extended) Miller set
are of this type (i.e., novel sentences). This raises the
question of how binding relations in these novel sentences
could be instantiated. As noted, in Feldman’s view this
could not be done on the basis of an existing connection
structure. Indeed, he used the ‘Sonnet’ sentence to argue
that this is not possible. Instead, in his view, it can be done
only with synchrony of activation.
But here a problem or confusion arises in his paper.
Feldman used the Shruti model (Shastri and Ajjanagadde
1993) as the example to show how synchrony of activation
could solve the binding issue in novel sentences. The
confusion is that Shruti is in fact a model of inferences in
long term memory. To produce these inferences, Shruti
critically depends on (entire) proposition representations
for its operations (see below for an example). This entails
that Shruti cannot be a model for novel binding as found in
the ‘Sonnet’ sentence given by Feldman, because there is
no proposition representation for this sentence in long term
memory (as explicitly ruled out by Feldman himself).
This raises an important question: why does Feldman
believe that Shruti can solve the binding issue in novel
combinations (as in the ‘Sonnet’ sentence) when in fact it
cannot? To answer this question, we first have to illustrate
the Shruti model. In particular, we have to show how the
model produces behavior (in this case, making inferences
in long term memory).
Connection structures and behavior
A cognitive process is of value to an organism when it can
influence its behavior, which implies that it is incorporated
in the sensorimotor loop of the organism (Shanahan 2010).
That is, a cognitive process somehow transforms sensory
information, carried by sensory nerves, into actions of
some kind, initiated by the activation of motor neurons.
Thus cognitive processes are executed in connection
structures that connect sensory circuits with motor circuits
(often in a bi-directional way, hence the notion of a loop).
For example, in the ‘Sonnet’ sentence of Feldman
(2013) the perception of the name ‘‘Sonnet’’ activates
(sensory) neurons. In answering the question ‘‘who is
brilliant?’’, motor neurons are activated that produce the
name ‘‘Sonnet’’. Regardless of how complex such cogni-
tive processes are, underlying connection structures are
needed to carry the flow of activation initiated in the senses
to the muscles (or vice versa). So, if a cognitive process
requires (novel) variable binding, e.g., the binding of items
in a combinatorial (compositional) structure (such as words
in a sentence), the binding of the items is also somehow
incorporated in the neuronal connection path that links
perception and action.
We can illustrate this with synchrony based models of
binding. Feldman (2013, Fig. 3) illustrated the Shruti
inference network (Shastri and Ajjanagadde 1993; Wen-
delken and Shastri 2004). The inference illustrated con-
cerns the notion that a buyer of an object is also the owner
of the object. However, Feldman (2013) presented only a
part of the inference network, as do Wendelken and Shastri
(2004). The (more) complete circuit, accounting for the
production of behavior (the inference in this case) is found
in Figure 12 of Shastri and Ajjanagadde (1993). This figure
illustrates two closely related inferences: buys(x, y)
) owns (x, y) and gives (x, y, z) ) owns (y, z).
In Fig. 1 we represent a part of the connection circuit in
Figure 12 of Shastri and Ajjanagadde (1993) that instan-
tiates the inference that if John gives Mary a book then
Mary owns a book. In this connection circuit there are item
nodes for John, Mary and book, and thematic relation
nodes for giver, recipient (recip) and given-object (g-obj).
There is also a ‘fact node’ (F1 in Figure 12 of Shastri and
Ajjanagadde 1993) or ‘collector node’ (Wendelken and
Shastri 2004) for the particular fact or belief John gives
Fig. 1 Variable binding based on synchrony of activation in Shruti
(based on Shastri and Ajjanagadde, 1993, Figure 12). The nodes for
arguments and thematic roles are in synchrony: John with giver
(green, unbroken lines), Mary with recipient (red, long-dashed lines),
and book with given-object (blue, short-dashed lines). Synchronous
nodes activate coincidence detectors (triangles), which activate a
proposition detector (‘fact node’) for John gives Mary a book. A
reasoning process can then activate Mary owns a book (recip = re-
cipient, g-obj = given-object). (Color figure online)
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Mary a book. The activation of this fact node is essential
for making the inference Mary owns a book. The role of
synchrony is to ensure the selective activation of this fact
node. So, in Fig. 1 the fact node for John gives Mary a
book is activated because the activation of John is in
synchrony with giver, the activation of Mary is in syn-
chrony with recipient and the activation of book is in
synchrony with given-object.
Because the synchrony relations in Fig. 1 uniquely
apply to the fact node John gives Mary a book, this fact
node is activated, instead of other fact nodes, such as Mary
gives John a book. Notice, however, that the fact node for
Mary gives John a book, and the dedicated connection
structure between this fact node and the item and thematic
relation nodes, would be needed to make the inference if
Mary gives John a book then John owns a book. Thus,
dedicated connection structures and fact nodes as illus-
trated in Fig. 1 are needed for any specific inference that
Shruti can make. This turns Shruti into a connectivity
based binding model, in contrast to Feldman’s assumption.
Other examples of specific (high-level) nodes and ded-
icated connection structures for producing behavior in
synchrony based binding models are the use of role-filler
nodes, e.g., Bill-lover, Mary-knower, Mary-beloved, and
proposition nodes, e.g., loves(Bill, Mary) and knows(Mary,
loves(Bill, Mary)), in the Learning and Inference with
Schemas and Analogies (LISA) model (e.g., Hummel and
Holyoak 2003) and the use of role-filler nodes, e.g., larger-
Fido, smaller-Sara, and proposition units, e.g., bigger(Fi-
do, Sara), in the Discovery of Relations by Analogy model
(DORA) of Doumas et al. (2008).
The use of proposition representations in the LISA
model is described by Knowlton et al. (2012, p. 374):
‘‘LISA codes an analog by binding distributed representa-
tions of roles to distributed representations of their fillers
(…). For each individual analog, a hierarchy of localist
structure units represents objects (O), relational roles (R),
individual role bindings (RB), and complete propositions
(P).’’ Figure 2 in their paper makes this very clear also.
And it illustrates that synchrony is used to effectively using
these representations.
So, in each of these cases we see that synchrony models
use available connection structures and representations to
produce behavior. In fact, the examples given show that
these synchrony models rely on very specific circuits rep-
resenting very specific combinations of items, up to
specific representations of entire propositions as John gives
Mary a book in Fig. 1 or even hierarchical (nested)
propositions as Mary knows that Bill loves Mary in LISA.
The role of synchrony in these models is not to avoid these
specific circuits and representations but to activate them
selectively. In Fig. 1, the synchrony between the item
nodes and the thematic relations nodes results in the
activation of the fact node for John gives Mary a book
instead of any other fact node (proposition representation).
But this selective activation process requires the existence
of these representations and the connection structures ac-
tivating them in the first place.
Two remarks should be made here. Firstly, the fact that
models like Shruti and LISA use proposition representa-
tions in their operations is not an issue, because these
models are models of processes based on long term
memory. Obviously, proposition representations can (and
will) be a part of long term memory. The use of proposition
representations in these models becomes an issue only
when these models are seen as solutions for the problem of
novel variable binding, as in Feldman’s (2013) analysis.
Secondly, just like the ‘static’ (connectivity based) models,
label (synchrony) based models of binding appear to rely
on existing connection structures as well when they pro-
duce behavior.
Hence, the question arises of why Feldman (2013) be-
lieves that the two types of models are different in the use
of existing connection structures, and why he believes that
a model like Shruti could handle novel variable binding,
even though it crucially depends on proposition represen-
tations. In our view, this results from a fundamental error in
analyzing the role of synchrony of activation in binding
models, as we will outline below.
Synchrony and frame of reference
An essential aspect of the synchrony of events is that it is
relative to the frame of reference in which the events are
Fig. 2 A difference in perspective, or frame of reference, can result
in different information obtained about a situation. Here, an office
building in which some of the rooms are lit in the evening, with two
frames of reference: an outside observer in front of the building and
an inside observer in one of the rooms
362 Cogn Neurodyn (2015) 9:359–370
123
observed. That is, two events can be synchronous in one
frame of reference but not in another (e.g., Misner et al.
1973). Thus, to assess the role of synchrony of activation in
binding models we have to consider the frame of reference
in which it is observed (the need to identify the frame of
reference in which observations are made is one of the
basic tenets of physics since Galilei).
Figure 2 illustrates an example. Assume an office
building where some people are still working in the
evening, which requires them to lighten their rooms. As
observed by an outside observer (e.g., standing on the
pavement in front of the building), this occurs in three of
the rooms in the building (1, 6 and 8). This observer might
come to the conclusion that the people in these rooms are
working together (are ‘bound’ so to speak) because of their
simultaneous presence in the evening. But what about an
observer located in one of the rooms, say room 6? Would
this person know that people are also working in room 1
and 8, but not in the other rooms?
The key point here is that this observer would not be
able to know that in the same manner as the outside
observer. The frame of reference for the latter is different
from the frame of reference of an inside observer. The
outside observer overlooks all rooms, so he or she can
directly see which rooms are lit. The inside observer
cannot directly see that. Of course, he or she could try to
obtain that information, e.g., by making contact with the
other rooms. But this requires a process not needed for
the outside observer. This process could influence the
observations made by the inside observer (e.g., because
there are no connections with certain rooms, or because
connections cause a delay in contact). Yet, to conclude
that the people in the building are working together, we
need the perspective of the inside observers. The per-
spective of an outside observer does not suffice to reach
that conclusion.
So, we need to identify the frame of reference when we
assess the role of synchrony of activation in binding
models. Feldman (2013, p. 6b) described the role of syn-
chrony of activation in binding as follows: ‘‘When an
attribute node fires in-phase with an object node, this co-
incidence represents a binding between them.’’ However,
this statement is meaningless because it does not identify
the frame of reference in which the synchrony of activation
is observed or analyzed. The same is true of Figs. 2 and 3
presented by Feldman (2013). These figures indicate the
synchrony of activation (or lack thereof) between rows or
nodes referring to the variables in a binding process. These
figures are also meaningless because they do not identify a
frame of reference as well. When we look at Fig. 1 in this
paper we can see a similar situation. We might conclude
from this figure that the node for John is bound with the
node for giver, because of their synchrony of activation.
However, this statement is also meaningless unless we
specify the frame of reference.
But perhaps a frame of reference is implicit in Feld-
man’s description quoted above and the Figs. 2 and 3 in
Feldman (2013). Comparing them with the situation il-
lustrated in (our) Fig. 2, it seems quite clear that Feld-
man’s description and figures are made in the outside
frame of reference. This can also be deduced from the
description given by Feldman (p 6b): ‘‘Fig. 2 below shows
an example of temporal phase binding… Notice that the
triangles (denoting spike trains) in row 1 remain aligned
with those in row 5 and similarly for rows 3 and 6.’’ As the
word ‘notice‘ indicates, a reader can see the phase syn-
chrony between rows 1 and 5 and that between rows 3 and
6 in the figure referred to by Feldman. But as readers we
have an outside frame of reference, which allows us to see
the phase synchrony in the rows of Feldman’s Fig. 2, or
the nodes in his Fig. 3, just as we can see the phase syn-
chrony between John and giver in Fig. 1 presented here. It
is important to note that a researcher measuring brain
activity also obtains observations in an outside frame of
reference. In that frame of reference one can indeed ob-
serve two neurons firing with the same frequency or firing
in phase synchrony.
But an outside frame of reference is not the frame of
reference in which the brain operates. So, by analyzing a
problem in an outside frame of reference we might begin
on the wrong foot. For example, we might assume that the
problem has been solved when in fact it hasn’t. Dennett
Fig. 3 The importance of the frame of reference in analyzing
synchrony of activation. In situation I, two source nodes (A, B) are in
synchrony (red, unbroken lines) in an outside frame of reference.
They are also in synchrony in the frame of reference of the target
(Fact) node, because their activation arrives in synchrony (red,
unbroken lines). In situation II, A and B are in synchrony in the
outside frame of reference (red, unbroken lines), but not in the frame
of reference of the Fact node, because their activation does not arrive
in synchrony (green and blue, dashed lines). In situation III, A and
B are in not synchrony in the outside frame of reference (green and
blue, dashed lines), but they are in synchrony in the frame of
reference of the Fact node, because their activation arrives in
synchrony (red, unbroken lines). (Color figure online)
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(1991) made a similar point when he discussed Crick and
Koch’s view of the role of frequency synchronization for
consciousness. In his words (Dennett 1991, p. 255):
‘‘Here, for instance, is a hypothesis hazarded by Francis
Crick and Christof Koch:
We have suggested that one of the functions of
consciousness is to present the results of various
underlying computations and that this involves an
attentional mechanism that temporarily binds the
relevant neurons together by synchronizing their
spikes in 40 Hz oscillations …
So a function of consciousness is to present the
results of underlying computations—but to whom?
(…) Crick and Koch do not go on to ask themselves
the Hard Question: And then what happens? (‘‘And
then a miracle occurs’’?).
Thus when we observe phase synchrony in an outside
frame of reference (e.g., by measuring brain activity in a
laboratory) we have to ask ‘Then what happens?’ by
analyzing how phase synchrony is used by the brain. For
this, we have to analyze the problem from an inside frame
of reference. This in turn raises the question of what this
frame of reference, i.e., the frame of reference used by the
brain, is. Feldman (2013) does not give us that information.
So, we have to guess. For example, we could analyze the
binding problem depicted in Fig. 1 presented here from the
perspective (frame of reference) of one of the nodes, say
the node for John. In the outside perspective we see that it
is in (phase) synchrony with the node for giver. Yet, the
question is whether the node for John itself would be able
to ‘know’ or ‘see’ that it is activated in synchrony with the
node for giver. To answer this question we have to identify
a mechanism that allows the node for John to arrive at this
conclusion. However, neither Feldman (2013) nor the
synchrony based binding papers we analyzed above pro-
vide such a mechanism.
Possibly the question of whether a node (neuron) would
be able to ‘know’ or ‘see’ that it is activated in synchrony
with another node (neuron) is the wrong question. Perhaps
the solution would be that no single node (neuron) would
have to observe synchrony of activation for binding to
occur. Instead, only the ‘overall’ system (i.e., the brain)
would have ‘know’ or ‘see’ that. But this solution in fact
just rephrases the problem: how would the ‘overall’ system
(brain) be able to know or see that? To answer this question
we need the description of a mechanism that shows how
the information (synchrony of activation in this case) can
be used by the brain. Without such a mechanism we would
indeed be relying on some kind of miracle to occur.
Possibly this mechanism is already available. Above we
illustrated and analyzed that synchrony based binding
models rely on specific connection structures to produce
behavior, as illustrated in Fig. 1. These connection struc-
tures would provide an inside frame of reference as used by
the brain, and thus an inside frame of reference in which
we could (and have to) analyze the role of synchrony of
activation in variable binding.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, in Shruti the fact node for John
gives Mary a book is activated when John is in synchrony
with giver, Mary is in synchrony with recipient and book is
in synchrony with given-object. So, in Shruti the inside
frames of reference for observing synchrony of activation
are given by the fact nodes of the model (or by the coin-
cidence detectors that activate the fact nodes, as in Fig. 1).
This, of course, is in agreement with the roles these fact
nodes play in producing behavior. It is also in agreement
with the role that synchrony of activation plays in the
model: the selective activation of fact nodes. A similar
observation can be made for the other synchrony based
binding models we analyzed above.
An inside frame of reference as given by the fact nodes in
Shruti allows us to analyze the role of synchrony of activa-
tion in binding models, and compare inside and outside
frames of reference in this respect. Figure 3 illustrates the
binding of two source nodes, A and B, in three different
situations. In situation I, A and B are in (phase) synchrony in
the outside frame of reference. They are also in synchrony in
the frame of reference of the fact (or collector) node to which
A and B are connected, because the connection paths be-
tween the source nodes and the fact node are of equal length.
So the activation from A and B reaches the fact node at the
same time (assuming equal conductivity along both paths).
In situation II, A and B are again in synchrony in the outside
frame of reference, but not in the inside frame of reference,
because the paths between the source nodes and the fact node
are of different length. This prevents the activation of the fact
node. In situation III, A and B are not in synchrony in the
outside frame of reference, but they are in synchrony in the
inside frame of reference, because the difference in path
length between the source nodes and the fact node ‘com-
pensates’ the asynchrony between A and B (as seen in the
outside frame of reference). Because the system in Fig. 3
operates in the inside frame of reference, it detects binding by
synchrony in situations I and III, but not in situation II. In the
outside frame of reference, however, A and B are in syn-
chrony in situations I and II but not in III.
Figure 3 underlines the difference between an outside and
inside frame of reference as illustrated in Fig. 2. Figure 3
(again) illustrates that synchrony based binding models need
specific connection structures and representations to achieve
binding in the inside frame of reference. Furthermore, Fig. 3
also shows another demand that synchrony based binding
models have to fulfill. Not only do they need specific con-
nection structures and representations to achieve binding
(and produce behavior on the basis of binding), but these
364 Cogn Neurodyn (2015) 9:359–370
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connection structures have to be of a restrictive kind. They
have to ensure that the synchrony of activation of the (source)
nodes is maintained at the fact or collector nodes that detect
the synchrony between the sources nodes, as with John, giver
and John gives Mary a book in Fig. 1. Because we are
dealing with the need for arbitrary variable bindings these
requirements have to be fulfilled for all possible combina-
tions of source nodes and fact nodes.
So, both ‘static’ (connectivity based) models and ‘label’
(synchrony) based models of binding appear to rely on
existing connection structures when they produce behavior.
This would also be true when these models could handle
novel variable binding. In this sense, both types of models
are connectivity based.
This raises the question of how novel variable binding, or
novel combinations of constituents, could be represented and
processed in existing connection structures. The specific
binding mechanism involved, e.g., dynamic interaction or
synchrony of activation, could vary. But any given mechan-
ism cannot depend on the existence of (entire) proposition
representations in dealing with novel variable binding.
Small-world connection structure
Connectivity based models can be models of variable
binding when their connection structure resembles a small-
world network. A small-world network is a connection
structure that combines dense local connectivity with
sparse long-range connectivity in such a way that the av-
erage path length between any two nodes in the network is
low (Watts and Strogatz 1998). As an example, consider
the collection of airfields visited by airlines. Any two air-
fields in this set are connected by a flight. Not because
there is a direct flight between any two fields, which would
indeed be very ineffective and inflexible, but because the
set resembles a small-world network. From any local field
you can go to, say, a national hub and from there to a
continental hub. This combines dense local connectivity
with sparse (long-range) connectivity. As a result, you can
travel from any field to any other with just a few transfers
(which gives low average path length).
There is strong evidence that the connectivity structures
of brains, including the human brain, resemble a small-
world network structure (see Shanahan 2010, for a review
and discussion). In this way (temporal) connection paths
can be created that provide the basis for variable binding.
Here, we do have to take into account the specific nature of
the process at hand. That is, variable binding in human
cognition is productive and flexible, but it does satisfy
certain boundary conditions.
As an example, consider the phonological structure of
words. At birth, babies are ‘universal speech perceivers’ in
the sense that they are sensitive to the phonetic contrasts in
all natural languages (e.g., Doupe and Kuhl 1999). But at
the end of the first year, they have become sensitized to
their own specific natural language. At that time they
recognize language specific phonetic combinations but fail
to distinguish between contrasts in other languages. Thus,
it would seem that the development of speech and language
recognition results in a ‘neural commitment’ (Kuhl 2004),
in which the brain has developed neural circuits that can
recognize and combine phonetic units of the familiar lan-
guage but fail to do so for unfamiliar languages.
This ‘neural commitment’ of the brain that develops
through learning and growth forms a boundary condition
for variable binding. In the case of phonology, natural
language users would be able to perceive and produce new
word forms in their own language (e.g., ‘Jabberwocky’),
but not in unfamiliar languages. In terms of connectivity
based models of variable binding, this difference results
from the fact that natural language speakers have devel-
oped the neural circuits and connection structures that al-
low them to recognize and combine the phonetic units of
their natural language. So, a model of variable binding
would have to account for that. But that model would not
have to account for universal phonetic variable binding,
based on the phonetic units of all languages. This differ-
ence puts a limitation of the flexibility of variable binding
and gives a boundary condition for binding models.
With this caveat in mind we can look at a few examples
of connectivity based binding. The first example is episode
binding. We have the ability to bind arbitrary items (e.g.,
persons, objects, events) as belonging to an episode. This is
clearly a very important cognitive ability, which allows us
to deal with complex and changing environments. An ar-
bitrary episode in our environment could consist of a new
collection of familiar items, never encountered before in
that specific combination. But with episode binding we can
reproduce which items co-occurred in an episode.
The hippocampus and the surrounding medial temporal
cortex play an important role in this ability. Norman and
O’Reilly (2003) proposed and simulated a model that ac-
counts for a range of behavioral observations related to
episode binding. The model is based on the anatomical
structure of the hippocampus and its connections with the
neocortex. These connections resemble a small-world
network structure. The hippocampus connects to the medial
temporal cortex (the entorhinal cortex). In turn, the medial
temporal cortex is connected to a broad range of cortical
regions in the frontal, temporal and parietal lobes (e.g.,
Squire and Wixted 2011).
The connection structure between the hippocampus and
the neocortex forms a loop. Connections enter the hip-
pocampus from the entorhinal cortex. They connect to the
dentate gyrus and CA3 of the hippocampus. From there,
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connections pass on to CA1 of the hippocampus and back
to the entorhinal cortex, and then to the neocortex. The
connections between the entorhinal cortex and hippocam-
pus and within the hippocampus exhibit long-term poten-
tiation (LTP), by which these connections are rapidly
modified (strengthened). For example, early LTP results
from a single train of action potentials and last for 1–3 h.
Repeated activation results in late LTP that can last for at
least a day (e.g., Kandel 2001).
The combination of (early) LTP and the connection
structure resembling a small-world network provide the basis
for arbitrary episode binding. Figure 4 schematically illus-
trates the binding of two arbitrary items (e.g., persons, objects,
events) A and B that co-occur in an episode. The neurons
representing (processing) the items somewhere in the neo-
cortex are connected to the hippocampus (via the medial
temporal cortex). These connections are sparse in the sense
that two different items activate substantially different sets of
neurons in the hippocampus, which results in pattern separa-
tion (Norman and O’Reilly 2003). LTP ensures a (temporal)
strengthening of these connections so that both items are
temporarily stored in memory. However, connections within
the hippocampus (CA3) are also strongly recurrent. With LTP
this results in the (temporal) interconnection between the
representations of A and B in the hippocampus. As a result, A
and B are bound in an episode.
The effect of episode binding can be seen in the pattern
completion capability of the hippocampus. Due to the re-
current connections, the hippocampus can restore an entire
pattern when only a part of it is initially activated (Norman
and O’Reilly 2003). In the left panel of Fig. 4, for example,
only item A is activated in the neocortex. It will activate
the set of neurons in the hippocampus to which it is
(temporally) connected. In turn, these neurons activate the
other set of neurons belonging to the episode, due to the
recurrent connectivity (and early LTP) in the hippocampus.
This, in turn, activates the item B in the neocortex, as
illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 4.
In this way, the brain can bind arbitrary items in an epi-
sode. There is substantial empirical evidence related to this
model of binding, as partly outlined above. Another example
of evidence are the ‘concept’ cells found in the medial
temporal lobe (e.g., Quian Quiroga 2012). These cells were
found in the medial temporal lobe (including the hip-
pocampus) of epilepsy patients, using intracranial mea-
surements. A remarkable feature of these cells is their highly
selective and multimodal invariant response profile. This
indicates that these cells receive activation from different
regions in the cortex, involved in different forms of infor-
mation processing (e.g., recognizing pictures vs. recognizing
names), in line with a small-world network structure. The
concept cells are ideally suited for rapid episodic
memorization and association (Quian Quiroga 2012), as il-
lustrated with cells in a patient that responded selectively to
the experimenters (persons) involved in the experiments.
Clearly, it would be of importance for an observer (a patient
in this case) to rapidly ‘bind’ important individuals to an
episode (e.g., an experiment) the observer is involved in. In
other words, concept cells also seem to rapidly register (bind)
important aspects of a here and now situation.
Recently, Wang et al. (2014) tested how the hip-
pocampus could ‘‘serve as a ‘hub’ to support binding of
information from distinct processing modules into asso-
ciative memories’’ (Wang et al. 2014, p. 1054). Firstly,
they determined a specific connection path between the
hippocampus and a part of the cortex (the lateral parietal
cortex), using resting state fMRI. Then, they enhanced the
connectivity in this path with repetitive transcranial mag-
netic stimulation. After this, resting state fMRI indeed
showed an increased connectivity between the hippocam-
pus and the selected cortical area. Behavioral experiments
showed that the enhanced connectivity resulted in an im-
proved memorization of arbitrary and novel pairs of items,
consisting of faces and written words.
The results of the Wang et al. (2014) experiment show
that an existing connectivity structure can be used to as-
sociate (bind) novel combinations of items. This ability can
even be manipulated by enhancing the connection struc-
ture. The effects of this memorization lasted up to 24 h,
which indicates that they are based on forms of synaptic
enhancement.
Synchrony models with small-world connection
structure
Small world connection structures could be combined with
synchrony of activation. For example, Li and Li (2011)
Fig. 4 Network structure in episode binding. Two arbitrary items
(object, events) A and B, represented in the neocortex, are bound in an
episode via connections and rapid long-term potentiation in the
hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal lobe (after Norman
and O’Reilly 2003). Ovals represent neurons (or populations of
neurons). Gray ovals are active. When A is activated in the neocortex,
it will activate B through the (temporal) connection structure between
them in the hippocampus (and medial temporal lobe)
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investigated how synchrony of activation could enhance
input segmentation in a small world network structure.
Baars et al. (2013) discussed the role of synchrony of
activation and resonance in forming functional hubs in the
Global Workspace model of consciousness. Their model
includes a small world network structure consisting of the
hippocampus and surrounding areas, as illustrated in
Fig. 4. Other structures of this kind in their model are the
cortical thalamic pathways. Baars et al. (2013, p. 20) de-
scribe the connection structure in this pathways and the
role of synchrony (oscillations) as follows: ‘‘Cortico-tha-
lamic pathways run in all canonical directions and follow
small-world organization, so that each array is efficiently
linked to many others. The entire system acts as an oscil-
latory medium, with markedly different global regimes in
conscious and unconscious states.’’
In these examples it is clear that the underlying (small
network) connection structure is an existing structure. So,
again, as in the examples of binding models discussed
above, the role of synchrony in these models is not to avoid
specific connection structures but to use them effectively.
A similar observation can be made of synfire chains. They
also depend on existing network structures, so they do not
violate the assumption that connection structures are
needed for binding. But as Abeles (2009) has pointed out
they could also achieve forms of combinatorial binding.
Although we are not aware of models of novel variable
binding along the lines as presented in this section, it is
clear that such models would have to account for novel
variable binding using an existing connection structure,
contrary to Feldman’s assumption, and they have to do so
without relying on entire proposition representations.
Binding by process
Another option for using small world connection structures
in novel variable binding is a form of binding we refer to as
‘binding by process’. To illustrate what this means, con-
sider again the set of airfields visited by airlines. Any two
airfields in this set can be bound. Not by attaching a
common label to them (which then has to be observed, say
from space). Instead, any two airfields are bound when a
person flies from one to the other, using the flexible net-
work structure in the set. The binding of items A and B in
Fig. 4 is of the same nature. They are not bound by some
common label. Instead, they are bound because activation
can flow from one to the other. This is possible because a
(temporal) connection path is formed in the flexible con-
nection structure to which A and B belong.
Examples of binding by process are the model of epi-
sode binding illustrated in Fig. 4, binding of perception and
action (Zylberberg et al. 2010), binding in visual working
memory (Swan and Wyble 2014) and binding in processing
relational knowledge (Pinkas et al. 2012).
Binding by process is also the basis of our model of
variable binding (van der Velde and de Kamps 2006a, b).
We can only briefly outline this model here. In (van der
Velde and de Kamps 2006a, b, 2010) we showed in detail
how neural mechanisms can integrate arbitrary words in
the lexicon in arbitrary sentence structures, including novel
sentences.
The model is a connectivity based binding model in
which neural word representations can be temporarily
bound in a sentence context, as illustrated with the binding
of the neural word representations of Tom, own and book in
Tom owns (a) book in Fig. 5. To achieve this in a flexible
manner, a small-world like connection structure is needed.
We referred to this structure as a ‘neural blackboard’.
Furthermore, the binding has to be relational. In Fig. 4, the
binding between A and B is in the form of an association,
but that is not sufficient for binding words in a sentence.
To achieve relational binding, the connection structure
in the neural blackboard consists of ‘conditional connec-
tions’, illustrated with the double-line connections in
Fig. 5. These connections consists of gating circuits that
need to be ‘opened’ or ‘activated’ to allow activation to
flow. In the model, conditional connections are activated
when certain conditions are met. For example, by the
(temporal) activation of a neural population that operates
as a working memory for a particular binding (e.g., binding
the word representation of Tom to a neural population N1
in Fig. 5, for details see van der Velde and de Kamps
2006a, b).
The small-world like connection structure illustrated in
Fig. 5 allows all familiar words to be bound in arbitrary
(but regular) sentence structures. This can occur because all
nouns for example are connected to a limited set of Ni
Fig. 5 Binding of the words Tom, own and book in the neural
blackboard representation of the sentence Tom owns (a) book (after
van der Velde and de Kamps 2006a, b). The ovals represent neural
word representations, the circles represent ‘syntax’ populations in the
neural blackboard. S1 is a ‘sentence’ population, N1 and N2 are ‘noun’
populations, V1 is a ‘verb’ population. The gray ovals and circles are
activated by the question ‘‘What does Tom own?’’
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populations (referred to as ‘noun assemblies’). When the
conditional connection between a noun and a particular Ni
assembly is activated, they are temporarily bound. In a
similar way, verbs can be bound to verb assemblies (Vi). In
turn, the specific Ni, and Vi assemblies can be bound in a
specific sentence structure (which can include other word
types as well). Because binding is temporal (determined by
the ongoing or ‘delay’ activation in the neural population
that controls the specific conditional connection), sentence
structures will decay over time in the neural blackboard,
allowing the connection structures in the blackboard to be
used for other sentences.
Binding by process is illustrated in Fig. 5. The gray
structure illustrates the sentence part in the blackboard that
is activated by the question ‘‘What does Tom own?’’. The
answer to this question can be found by activating the
conditional connection between V1 and N2. This connec-
tion can be activated because the question asks for the
theme (object) of the verb in the sentence, and V1 and N2
are connected as verb and theme. Thus, this connection is
activated by a control signal that activates the verb-theme
relations in the blackboard (for a simulation of this process,
see van der Velde and de Kamps 2006a, b). This will
activate N2 and with it book.
Above we argued that all binding models must be con-
nectivity based models, because a connection structure is
needed to produce behavior, that is, interconnect sensory
and motor activation. The binding by process illustrated in
Fig. 5 (and Fig. 4) is of this kind. In both cases the binding
is achieved whenever a behavior (output) needs to be
produced that depends on the binding relation. In Fig. 5
this consists of answering the question ‘‘What does Tom
own?’’. In Fig. 4 this consists of answering a query like
‘‘What item co-occurred in the episode to which A be-
longs?’’. In other words, the binding by process in con-
nectivity based models is a direct consequence of the need
for connection structures to produce behavior.
Novel variable binding in existing connection structures
Feldman (2013) argued that connectivity based binding
models cannot handle novel variable binding. The model
illustrated in Fig. 5 and described in detail in (van der
Velde and de Kamps 2006a, b, 2010) can combine any
word in the lexicon in any arbitrary sentence context. That
is, it can handle the ‘Miller set’ (see section ‘‘Variable
binding in novel combinations’’). Because of the magni-
tude of this set, most of these sentences are novel. More-
over, the architecture illustrated in Fig. 5 does not rely on
representations of entire propositions. So, novel variable
binding is possible with an existing (small world like)
connection structure.
However, Feldman used the ‘Sonnet’ sentence as an
example of novel variable binding (see above), in which he
introduced a new word as well (i.e., the name ‘Sonnet’).
So, we can also bind a new word or name, such as Sonnet,
in sentences or inferences like if John gives Sonnet a book
then Sonnet owns a book. These sentences are not in the
Miller set because that set is based on an existing lexicon.
Instead, they belong to the ‘extended Miller set’ (see
above).
It is quite remarkable to see that Feldman proceeds, after
introducing the issue of novel variable binding with the
‘Sonnet’ sentence, with discussing and advocating binding
by synchrony, in particular Shruti (Shastri and Ajjanagadde
1993). In particular, he does not raise the question as to
whether these models (e.g., Shruti) could handle new
words in sentences or inferences like if John gives Sonnet a
book then Sonnet owns a book. Apparently he assumes they
can. Perhaps because a new (but apparently available) node
representing Sonnet could be in synchrony with the nodes
for recipient or owner, which would assure their binding.
But, as we discussed above, this is binding in an outside
frame of reference, which is not the correct frame of ref-
erence for analyzing neural binding problems.
In Fig. 1 we illustrated that in Shruti an inside frame of
reference for binding by synchrony is given by the fact (or
collector) nodes that are needed to produce behavior (make
the inference). So, for the inference that if John gives
Sonnet a book then Sonnet owns a book, we need a fact
node for John gives Sonnet a book. And we need the
dedicated connection structure that produces the activation
of this node based on the synchrony relations John-giver,
Sonnet-recipient and book-given-object. In fact, we need
fact nodes and dedicated connection structures for all po-
tential relations in which Sonnet could appear. Shruti does
this for inferences in long term memory. But if Sonnet is a
new node, where do all of these fact nodes and connection
structures come from?
The issue of binding new items is of course also im-
portant for binding models. We briefly dealt with this
issue in our target paper (van der Velde and de Kamps
2006a, p 61a) and more extensively in the reply paper
(section R4 and Figure R1 in van der Velde and de
Kamps 2006b). The solution is based on the observation
that language has (at least) a two tier structure (Jack-
endoff 2002). That is, words can be bound in an unlim-
ited number of sentence structures (giving the Miller set).
But words themselves are also compositional (phono-
logical) structures, which arise by binding phonemes and
morphemes in line with the phonological regularities
underlying a given language. So, the reason that we have
a potentially unlimited number of words (items) that
could be bound to a variable in a sentence structure
(giving the extended Miller set) results from the fact that
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words themselves are compositional structures. But the
set of phonemes and morphemes we use to make words is
limited in a given language.
Above we discussed the observation that babies are born
as universal language perceivers, but that in the course of a
year they become specialized for their own natural lan-
guage. This specialization results from a ‘neural commit-
ment’ (Kuhl 2004) that arises during development. We
would argue that this neural commitment results in a small-
world like connection structure that allows the formation of
compositional phonological word-forms to be made and
perceived. We referred to this small-world like connection
structure as a neural blackboard for phonological structure
(van der Velde and de Kamps 2006b).
Figure 6 illustrates the interaction between the black-
board for phonological structure and the blackboard for
sentence structure in establishing the binding relations in
the sentence Sonnet owns a book. Assuming that /so/, /nn/
and /et/ are the phonemes/morphemes of the word Sonnet,
they bind to a ‘word assembly’ in the phonological
blackboard. In turn, this word assembly can bind to sen-
tence structures. This binding will be regulated by the
perception that Sonnet is a noun (van der Velde and de
Kamps 2010). In a similar way as illustrated in Fig. 5, the
combined blackboard will answer a question like ‘‘Who
owns the book?’’ by activating /so/, /nn/ and /et/ in the
phonological blackboard (based on the initial activation of
the sentence part own book, activated by the question).
It is important to understand that the boundary condi-
tions on binding come into play here. We have the ability
to make and recognize arbitrary phonological structures in
our own language, including new words or nonsense
(pseudo)words like ‘Jabberwocky’. We can do this because
the set of phonemes and morphemes in a language is
limited. Hence, during growth and learning we can develop
a small-world like connection structure that allows arbi-
trary phonological combinations to be made in our lan-
guage. But we do not have that ability for unfamiliar
languages, because we have not developed small-world
like connection structures for their phonological structures.
In the same way, we can form and make arbitrary sentence
structures, but only in the languages we are familiar with.
To do so in unfamiliar languages would require an exten-
sive process of learning, needed to develop the small-world
like connection structures for these languages.
There is clearly less experimental evidence for small-
world like connection structures for language compared to
episode binding, partly due to the complexities involved in
studying the human brain. However, in a neuroimaging
study Pallier et al. (2011) observed a difference between
two sets of brain areas, using a contrast between sentences
with words and sentences with (meaningless) pseudowords.
One set of brain areas seemed to be involved in processing
and representing the (lexical-semantic) content of the
sentences. The other set was activated by the abstract
(syntactical) structure of sentences, irrespective of their
content. This distinction is in line with the distinction be-
tween neural word representations and a neural ‘syntax’
blackboard as illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6.
Conclusions
We compared two types of models used for variable
binding, one based on binding by synchrony and the other
based on binding by available connection structures. In his
review of the neural binding problem(s), Feldman (2013)
argued that models based on available connection struc-
tures (or ‘static’ models as he called them) cannot account
for novel variable binding but synchrony based models can.
We showed that Feldman (2013) used an outside frame
of reference in his analysis of binding by synchrony, in-
stead of an inside frame of reference in which the (variable)
binding problem should be analyzed. If the latter frame of
reference is taken into account, binding by synchrony also
relies on existing connection structures. This is not a co-
incidence. Connectivity based models are the only viable
candidates as models of binding because connection
structures are needed to produce behavior, including be-
havior based on novel variable binding.
The synchrony based models analyzed by Feldman
(2013) do indeed use specific representations and connec-
tion structures because they (to their credit) produce be-
havior. The role of synchrony in these models is not to
avoid these representations and connection structures, but
to use them effectively. Furthermore, the representations
Fig. 6 The neural sentence representation of Sonnet owns book, by
combining a phonological neural blackboard with the neural
(sentence) blackboard in Fig. 5. The phonological neural blackboard
binds the familiar phonemes/morphemes /so/, /nn/ and /et/ to a ‘word
assembly’ W1, which binds to the sentence structure Sonnet owns
book (after van der Velde and de Kamps 2006b). The gray ovals and
circles are activated by the question ‘‘Who owns the book?’’
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and connection structures used in synchrony models ana-
lyzed by Feldman (2013) are very specific, up to entire
propositions and nested propositions. This is not an issue
because these models are models of processes based on
long term memory. But for novel variable binding, aimed
for by Feldman (2013), representations of entire proposi-
tions and nested propositions will not be available.
Novel variable binding can be achieved on the basis of
existing connection structures when these structures re-
semble that of a small-world network. Such connection
structures provide the flexibility needed for variable bind-
ing, even for the binding of novel items (e.g., words,
events) in novel structures (e.g., sentences, episodes). One
way to achieve this is by creating a temporal connection
structure in line with the cognitive structure (e.g., propo-
sition) at hand. This temporal structure can be used to
produce a flow of activation in line with the represented
binding relations. This binding by process is in line with
the need for connection structures to produce behavior. In
also underlines the very dynamical way in which variable
binding is achieved in small-world like connectivity based
models.
But we have to take the boundary conditions on these
forms of binding into account. The variable binding will
succeed only for compositional structures for which the
basis (recognizing items and the ability to form combina-
tions) has been learned. An example is the ability to rec-
ognize and make arbitrary phonological word-forms in a
familiar language, which begins to develop in the first year
of life.
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